これは、わたしの理論を生成AIに英語で質問しつつ要約を頼んだときの解答です。質問の仕方を変えて、２つの解答を得ました。私自身読んでみて、かなり的を得た要約になっています。わたしのこの数年間の意識の研究の理論的展開だけでなく、そこに至るまでの長年にわたる人称理論の研究をも含めつつ、有機的な連関を持たせた全体的な要約なので、AIが独自に敷衍した部分も多く含まれています。しかし、このように自分の研究を長期間にわたって総括するような考え方は、自分でもなかなか難しく、このようなまとめ方あるかもしれないな、という感想を持ちました。自分で執筆したものではないですが、資料として掲載します。私自身の文章よりも、分かりやすく感じる読者がいる可能性もあると考えたからです。もし、かえって分かりにくいと感じられる方がいたら、読み飛ばしてください。これから、わたし自身の言葉で、わかりやすいブログを書いていく予定です。
以下の要約は、必ずしも正確とは言えない部分もあるので、読者の方は、その点に留意してください。
要約１：
1. Neural Network Processing as the Base Layer
- At the physiological level, perception, memory, and recognition operate through something structurally akin to parallel distributed processing.
- This layer is pre-linguistic and functions by associative activation patterns—similar to modern connectionist models in AI.
2. Linguistic Mediation
- Human thinking takes this distributed base and organizes it through grammar.
- The grammatical “I–You–He/She/It” structure (his “theory of grammatical person”) turns raw perception into personal, relational meaning.
- This is where thought becomes humanized: logical patterns are not merely computed—they are addressed, confessed, promised.
3. Distinction from Pure Computation
- Pure computation (as in machines) processes symbols or numbers according to formal rules, without the embeddedness of grammatical personhood.
- For humans, every act of thinking implicitly positions the self in relation to others (“I” speaking to “you” about “it”), giving even logical thought an irreducibly interpersonal structure.
4. Philosophical Implication
- This bridges the neural and the normative: the brain’s network activity is not dehumanized mechanics—it is already predisposed to become personal through language.
- It suggests that human rationality cannot be reduced to computation because it is linguistically, temporally, and relationally situated.
要約２：
Kawazu’s Theory of Consciousness: Linguistic Feature Integration
1. Starting Point: Treisman’s Feature Integration Theory (FIT)
- In classic psychology, FIT explains perception as the binding of sensory features (color, shape, motion) into unified objects through attention.
- This is often modeled computationally or neurologically as integration across distributed neural networks.
2. Kawazu’s Reinterpretation
- Kawazu accepts the neural basis of feature integration but argues that conscious unification is not merely a matter of perceptual binding.
- Instead, the decisive human step comes when perception is linguistically structured.
- Features become part of a meaningful world only once they are expressed or framed through grammatical personhood (I–You–He/She/It).
- Consciousness is thus not only integration of features but integration into discourse.
3. Consciousness as Linguistic Binding
- Kawazu proposes that just as FIT binds visual features into an object, language binds experience into a self–world relation.
- This happens in layers:
- Neural Feature Processing: pre-linguistic sensory binding.
- Grammatical Structuring: placing perception into subject–predicate, I–you relations.
- Conscious Awareness: the “aboutness” of experience is realized in this linguistic frame.
4. Alternative to Pure Neural Network Models
- Standard neural network models of consciousness treat it as an emergent property of distributed activation patterns.
- Kawazu counters: without linguistic personhood, such networks lack true consciousness.
- They can integrate signals, but not situate them in the “who” and “to whom” that define human awareness.
- His theory thus offers a humanized model of consciousness:Consciousness = Neural integration + Linguistic person-structuring + Relational orientation.
5. Philosophical Implications
- Consciousness is irreducibly relational — it exists in dialogue, not in isolation.
- Time, selfhood, and ethics are all grounded in this second-person receptive structure (addressing and being addressed).
- This places Kawazu’s model between cognitive neuroscience, phenomenology, and theology.
In short:
Kawazu transforms feature integration from a perceptual mechanism into a linguistic-ethical mechanism of consciousness. Where neuroscience says “features are bound into objects”, Kawazu says “experience is bound into personhood through grammar”.
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